@book {2004,
title = {An Introduction to Auction Theory},
year = {2004},
pages = {199},
publisher = {Oxford University Press},
organization = {Oxford University Press},
edition = {1st},
abstract = {This book presents an in-depth discussion of the auction theory. It introduces the concept of Bayesian Nash equilibrium and the idea of studying auctions as games. Private, common, and affiliated values models and multi-object auction models are described. A general version of the Revenue Equivalence Theorem is derived and the optimal auction is characterized to relate the field of mechanism design to auction theory.},
keywords = {affiliated values model, auction theory, Bayesian Nash equilibrium, common values model, multiple objects, private values model, Revenue Equivalence Theorem},
isbn = {9780199275984},
doi = {10.1093/019927598X.001.0001},
url = {http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/019927598X.001.0001/acprof-9780199275984},
author = {Flavio M. Menezes and Paulo K. Monteiro}
}